This is an open fragment of the “Flight safety and first aid” module from the Basic track, plus a ten-question test. You can read it and take the test without signing up — so you can see how the school works from the inside.
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Safety is a system, not a list of prohibitions
The analysis of almost any paragliding accident ends the same way: there is no single cause. There is a chain of small things, each harmless on its own. Slept badly — left later — hurried at the launch site — cut the pre-launch check short — did not notice that the reserve pin had come out of its loop — flew into a sharp, narrow thermal (a rising column of warm air). No single link was fatal. The sequence was.
Hence the main conclusion of the module: to stop an accident, it is enough to break any one link. Almost always that costs a minute of time and one calm “no”.
In Gudauri the price of a mistake is higher than at flatland sites. Below the main tandem launch there are more than 400 metres of sheer cliffs. The thermals here are sharp, narrow and rough. Landing fields are few, and there is usually nowhere to land “somewhere nearby”.
In 2022 a Border Police helicopter crashed near Gudauri. It was carrying out a rescue operation searching for paraglider pilots; eight people on board died. After that the regulation of the industry was tightened. The price of a mountain rescue operation is measured in other people’s lives. The calculation “I’ll fly, and if something happens they’ll send help” is not a decision.
A safety culture is when the decision “I’m not flying” is not discussed, not mocked and needs no justification. Not from a student, and not from a tandem pilot with a thousand flights. If such a decision is joked about, the site is unsafe — regardless of the weather.
A fine point for pros. More dangerous than the mistake itself is getting used to it. Every successful flight on the edge shifts your inner norm: what looked like the limit a year ago looks like an ordinary day today. This is called normalization of deviance. The only cure is an external reference — written personal minimums that you do not change on the day of the flight.
The chain of events and how to break it
The model used in aviation is called the “Swiss cheese” model. It was proposed by the psychologist James Reason. Imagine several slices of cheese standing one behind another. Each slice is a layer of protection: training, equipment check, briefing, right-of-way rules, the reserve. Each has holes — weak spots. Usually the holes do not line up, and the danger runs into the next slice. An accident happens when the holes line up in a row.
The DHV — the German Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association — puts the same thing more briefly: accidents are, as a rule, caused by a chain of events and wrong decisions.
Two conclusions follow from the model. First: one hole does not kill, so looking for “the main cause” is pointless. Second: to stop an accident it is enough to close any hole — not necessarily the first one.
Link
What it looks like
How to break it
The evening before
Went to bed at two in the morning
Move the flight to another day
The drive
Left an hour late
Say out loud: one flight today instead of three
The launch site
A queue, other people’s wings underfoot
Step aside and prepare there
The check
“I fastened the leg straps, I’m sure I remember”
Five points out loud, then a second person
Launch
The wing came up crooked, but “I’ll manage”
Bring the wing down, start again
The first seconds
Drifting sideways towards the rocks
Abort the run
In the air
A sharp thermal near the slope
Move away from the slope into the valley
A fine point for pros. An experienced pilot closes holes faster — and therefore flies more often with holes already open. Skill works like one more slice of cheese, and that is dangerous: it lets you pull yourself out of situations a beginner would never have got into. The right question to ask yourself is not “can I handle it”, but “what is left if today I handle it worse than usual”.
Statistics: where and when accidents happen
The most careful risk estimate to date was published in 2022 in the journal Wilderness & Environmental Medicine by Matt Wilkes’s group. The researchers combined a survey of 1,655 paraglider pilots with an analysis of a thousand incidents from a European database for 2012–2019:
1.4 fatalities per 100,000 flights (confidence interval 1.1–1.9);
20 serious injuries per 100,000 flights (18–27);
per unit of time — 1.6 fatalities and 23 serious injuries per 100,000 flight hours.
Phase of flight
Share of injuries
Landing approach and landing
39 percent (393 cases)
Launch
21 percent (206 cases)
Ridge soaring along the slope
20 percent (189 cases)
German statistics say the same. According to the DHV analysis for 2024, 385 incident reports came in: 167 with serious injuries and 10 fatal. By phase: launch — about 112 cases, landing approach — about 101, landing — about 45, leaving the slope and cross-country — about 58. Among the causes, wing collapses come first: 63 cases, 31 serious injuries, 4 fatal. Next come obstacles on approach — 40 cases, including 15 cars and 10 trees. Then stalls on approach: 13 cases, one fatal. Knots in the lines are a separate line — about 14 cases in a year.
A caveat is mandatory: these are reports, not a complete census. The DHV database contains what pilots reported themselves, and roughly half of the cases happened abroad. These numbers cannot be divided by the number of flights — the denominator is unknown.
Part of the body
Number of injuries
Legs and feet
287
Lumbar spine
165
Arms, hands, shoulder
146
Thoracic spine
80
Chest
69
Pelvis
55
Head
33
Cervical spine
28
The spine in total — 273 injuries out of 659. This is a direct consequence of how the pilot meets the ground: seated, with a vertical impact along the axis of the body. Two conclusions follow. First: the back protector under the seat is not a formality. Second: on landing you must get onto your feet in time, not take the impact with your pelvis and lower back.
A fine point for pros. Notice what is missing from these tables. There is no “equipment failure” as a noticeable cause. Wings and reserves almost never break by themselves. What is there is knots in the lines, unfastened leg straps and obstacles on approach — that is, preparation and decisions. If you want to invest an hour in your own safety, invest it in ground handling and in analysing your approach, not in choosing a new wing.
Pre-flight and pre-launch check
Before take-off the pilot must check the wing, the lines, the pin and the handle of the reserve parachute. Radio communication is checked separately. The pin is the peg that keeps the reserve closed: while it sits correctly, the parachute will not come out by itself. Instruments are checked too — the batteries must last for the whole flight.
Wing. Inspect the top and bottom surfaces, the ribs (the internal walls that hold the wing’s shape), the seams and the cell openings.
Lines. Untangle them completely and check the free travel of the brakes (the control handles). The free brake travel is checked precisely during the pre-launch check — not when laying out and not when packing the wing.
Harness. Leg straps, chest strap, carabiners, buckles, back protector.
Reserve. Pin in the correct position, handle reachable with one hand, container closed.
Helmet. On and fastened. Radio. On, correct channel, communication checked by voice.
A separate point is weight. Every certified wing is tested at both the minimum and the maximum take-off weight of its range. The manufacturer must confirm how the wing behaves at both limits. Outside the range the wing does not behave as written in the certificate, and there are no more guarantees. If the actual loading does not match the weight limits of the wing and the reserve, flying is explicitly prohibited.
An example. The pilot weighs 85 kilograms, the equipment 20, the wing is certified for 130–220 kilograms. With a 95-kilogram passenger the take-off weight comes to 200 — within the range. With a 120-kilogram passenger it comes to 225 — already beyond the upper limit. An excess of “only” five kilograms means flying in a configuration that nobody has ever tested.
You must not prepare for launch right at the launch position. Preparation is done where an accidental launch is least likely.
Helmet — on, fastened, strap not twisted.
Harness — both leg straps closed, chest strap closed, nothing hanging loose.
Carabiners and risers — closed and locked, risers not mixed up, nothing trapped.
Reserve — container closed, pin in place, handle reachable, bridle not pinched.
Lines and brakes — free, no knots, brakes in hand, free travel checked.
A separate word about leg straps. This is the best-known fatal mistake in paragliding, and it happens to experienced people. The pilot gets into the harness not through the legs but from above, and after lift-off falls out. In DHV accident reports such cases repeat year after year. It is caught with one movement: sitting in the harness, take hold of both leg straps with your hands and pull. Don’t look — pull.
A fine point for pros. The danger is not a skipped item but a broken ritual. If someone calls out to you in the middle of the check, you will almost certainly continue from the wrong place. The rule: interrupted — start again from the first point. And one more thing: the check is done with the hands, not the eyes. Your eyes confirm what you expect to see — that is a property of attention, not carelessness.
Case study. The pilot clipped in, stood up, and a friend came over — for a hug. After the conversation the pilot returned to the launch position and launched. In the air it turned out that the chest strap was unfastened. Actions in the air: don’t make sudden movements, hold the risers with your hands, fly smoothly, minimal turns, land at the first suitable field. Why: an unfastened chest strap will not drop the pilot, but it sharply increases the spread of the carabiners and the risk of a twist during a collapse. What should have been done: after the conversation — from the first point.
Answer — and see the explanation right away
Test: 10 questions
The questions come in a random order every time — from a bank of 40 questions.
This is about one percent of the school
Inside — three tracks, ten modules and about eighty thousand words of theory: case studies, checklists, tables and the fine points you usually learn only at the launch site. Plus 700 questions with an explanation for every answer, and exam simulators. Module texts are in Russian for now; the English versions are being prepared.
